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ARGUMENT 
I. THE ASSOCIATION'S, AND THE DISTRICT COURT'S, RELIANCE ON 
THE ASSOCIATION'S DECLARATIONS AS AUTHORIZING THE 
SUBJECT VOTE FAILS SINCE THE DECLARATIONS, AND THE VOTE, 
ADMITTEDLY DID NOT COMPLY WITH THE UNANIMITY 
REQUIREMENTS OF SECTION 16-6-33 OF THE NONPROFIT 
CORPORATIONS ACT 
The "Brief of Plaintiff-Appellee Park West Condominium Association, Inc." (the 
"Association's Brief) is an invitation for this Court to ignore clear, express, and 
mandatory statutes in order to allow Plaintiff-Appellee Park West Condominium 
Association, Inc. (the "Association") to get away with having done so. This Court 
should deny that invitation, reverse the district court, and declare the Association's 
claimed special assessment at issue in this case (the "Claimed Assessment") void, 
invalid, and unenforceable against Defendants-Appellants Lawrence and Judith Deppt 
(the "Deppes"). 
As shown more fully in the Deppes' initial brief filed with this Court, both as a 
matter of statutory law and under established precedents of this Court, condominium 
owners who form an association and incorporate are subject to the requirements of Utah's 
condominium ownership act and the nonprofit act. E.g., Utah Code § 57-8-35(1) (stating 
provisions of Utah's Condominium Ownership Act "shall be in addition and 
supplemental to all other provisions of law, statutory or judicially declared"); Levangerv. 
Vincent, 2000 UT App. 103 If 13, 3 P.3d 187, 189 ("by incorporating into a homeowners 
association, the homeowners bound themselves to the requirements of Utah's Nonprofit 
Corporations statute"); Reedeker v. Salisbury, 952 P.2d 577, 585 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) 
367523 1 1 
(holding condominium owners' association was subject to requirements of Utah's 
Nonprofit Corporations Act "in addition to" those of Utah Condominium Act). 
The Association in this case does not dispute that since the condominium owners 
in this case chose to join together and incorporate into the Association, there are therefore 
two state statutes that apply to it - the Utah Condominium Ownership Act, as it was in 
effect when the subject vote was conducted in the year 2000, appearing at Utah Code 
§§ 57-8-1 through -38 (the "Condominium Act"), and the Utah Nonprofit Corporation 
and Co-operative Association Act as it was in effect at that same time, appearing at Utah 
Code §§ 16-6-18 through -112 (the "Nonprofit Corporations Act"). Indeed, the 
Association quotes the Utah Supreme Court in expressly acknowledging the "well 
established precedent" that homeowners' associations are bound by "the bylaws of [the] 
corporation, together with the articles of incorporation, the statute under which it was 
incorporated, and the member's application." (Association's Brief, p. 10 (quoting Turner 
v. Hi-Country Homeowners Ass % 910 P.2d 1223, 1225 (Utah 1996) (emphasis added)). 
The Association's analysis, however, focuses only on the Association's internal 
"Condominium Declarations" (the "Declarations") as purportedly providing authority 
for the mail-in vote that it conducted on the Claimed Assessment at issue in this case to 
be conducted by a majority only, despite the requirement for unanimity of mail-in votes 
under section 16-6-33 of the Nonprofit Corporations Act admittedly applicable at the 
time the subject vote was taken in the year 2000. (Association's Brief, pp. 7-12). So too 
did the district court rely exclusively on the Declarations as the basis for its ruling that the 
subject vote and Claimed Assessment were valid, explaining its view that the 
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Condominium Act and the Nonprofit Corporations Act apply only where a 
condominium's declarations are silent on a point. Since the Declarations in this case 
were not silent on mail-in voting, the district court reasoned that the mail-in voting 
provisions of the Declarations trumped application of those statutes. (R. 0444) ("Since 
the 1981 Declaration is not silent on the issue, the two Acts referred to by the Deppes 
never came into play on the issue of mail-in voting. The 1981 Declaration governs the 
mail-in voting on the assessment.")). There is no merit to the Association's and the 
district court's view that the Association's Declarations somehow can trump application 
of the Nonprofit Corporations Act. Indeed, the very argument is directly contrary to 
governing law which holds statutes are paramount to corporate documents. 
There is no dispute that in the year 2000, when the voting on and purported 
approval of the Claimed Assessment occurred, section 16-6-33 of the Nonprofit 
Corporations Act provided as follows: 
Any action required by this act to be taken at a meeting of the 
members or trustees of a nonprofit corporation, or any action which may be 
taken at a meeting of the members or trustees may be taken without a 
meeting if a consent in writing, setting forth the action so taken, shall be 
signed by all of the members entitled to vote with respect to the subject 
matter thereof, or all of the trustees, as the case may be. 
Utah Code Ann. § 16-6-33 (1999 Repl.) (repealed by SB 61, 2000 Gen. Sess., effective 
April 30, 2001) (emphasis added). Although the Utah Legislature repealed this provision 
in its 2000 General Session, the Association does not dispute that the repeal of that 
provision and the imposition of the new statute did not become effective until April 30, 
2001. See UT Legis 300 (2000), § 235 (setting effective date). Thus, at the time the 
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mail-in vote on the Claimed Assessment at issue in this case was conducted in the year 
2000, the Nonprofit Corporations Act was very clear, and this Court has confirmed as 
shown below, that in order to approve any action by a mail-in vote all of the members 
entitled to vote must unanimously approve such action in writing. 
The Association's and the district court's, reliance on the Declarations as 
somehow governing over, and indeed circumventing, the unanimity requirement of 
section 16-6-33 of the Nonprofit Corporations Act fails as a matter of law. As shown in 
the Deppes' initial brief to this Court, it is well-settled that statutory provisions are 
superior to corporate documents and that corporate documents must comport with 
governing statutes. The Association offers no rebuttal to the application of those 
principles to this case. That is because there simply is no such rebuttal. As shown in the 
Deppes' initial brief, and completely ignored by the Association, in Utah it is a matter of 
statutory law that corporations expressly are empowered only to make or alter bylaws 
that are "not inconsistent with ... the laws of this state." Utah Code § 16-6-22(12) (1999 
Repl.) (emphasis added). As a matter of law, therefore, corporate statutes are superior to 
corporate bylaws and other documents adopted by a corporation such as the Association. 
A corporation's actions must comply with the dictates of the laws of this state, or they are 
void. That also is the law throughout the country. Deppes have not found, nor has the 
Association cited, any reported case in the entire country that has held, as the district 
court's Order in this case holds and as the Association argues, that a nonprofit 
corporation may contract around or otherwise circumvent the express and unequivocal 
requirements of the Nonprofit Corporations Act, whether by adoption of inconsistent 
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declarations, articles, bylaws, or otherwise. Accordingly, to the extent the Association's 
Declarations purport to authorize less than unanimous mail-in voting, they are 
inconsistent with the unanimity requirement of section 16-6-33 of Utah's Nonprofit 
Corporations Act and are invalid as a matter of law. The Association's, and the district 
court's, focus on the Association's Declarations as somehow constituting paramount 
authority for the mail-in voting in contravention of the Nonprofit Corporations Act is 
legally incorrect and unsupportable. 
Levanger v. Vincent, 2000 UT App. 103, 3 P.3d 187, is highly instructive to the 
case at bar. It dealt specifically and directly with the unanimity requirement for mail-in 
voting under section 16-6-33 of the Nonprofit Corporations Act, the very provision at 
issue in this case, including specifically in the context of a homeowner's association like 
the Association in this case. In Levanger, the plaintiffs were members of the Highland 
Estates Property Owners Association who sued the association's board of trustees 
seeking to have the court set aside amendments to the covenants, conditions, and 
restrictions ("CC&Rs") governing the association's conduct. When the trustees could not 
obtain the required vote of the owners at the association's annual meeting, they decided 
that a mail-in ballot would be the best way to notify the homeowners of the proposed 
changes to the CC&Rs and maximize participation in the election. Id. ffl[ 3-4. Of the 262 
lot owners, 149 were in favor of the amendments, 26 were opposed to them, and 87 did 
1
 The Association's argument that the Declarations are a contract is unavailing. 
(Association's Brief, pp. 10-11, & 18-19). Even if that were the case it would to make 
the Declarations sacrosanct and beyond judicial review. They still would have to 
comport with governing statutes, and they still do not comply with section 16-6-33. 
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not vote. Id. % 6. While the trial court concluded that this constituted a valid vote, this 
Court reversed, explaining: 
We conclude that, because the voting procedures [set forth in the 
Nonprofit Corporations Act] protect the members' interests, they are 
mandatory rather than directory and therefore strict compliance is 
required. Because the mail-in balloting procedure did not comply 
strictly with either the Act or the Association's by-laws, we conclude it 
was ineffectual. 
Levanger at f 19. This Court therefore invalidated the amendments to the CC&Rs 
that were purportedly approved by the mail-in vote, because they were not 
approved by all members and therefore "lacked unanimous written consent 
[required under section 16-6-33 of the Nonprofit Corporations Act] in the absence 
of a shareholders meeting." Id. f^ij 15 & 19. 
The same provision and reasoning apply to invalidate the mail-in vote and the 
Claimed Assessment in the instant case. Section 16-6-33 of the Nonprofit Corporation 
Act applies because the Condominium Act is silent as to the ability of an association to 
conduct mail-in voting. Section 16-6-33, on its face and as held by this Court, requires 
that a mail-in vote must be unanimous. The mail-in vote in this case, however, 
admittedly was not unanimous - by the Association's own official tally, 17% of the 
Association's members who were entitled to vote (including the Deppes) did not vote at 
all, and another 19% of the Association's members who did vote voted against the 
Claimed Assessments. Since the mail-in vote did not result in unanimous approval of the 
Claimed Assessment, it did not strictly comply with section 16-6-33, which is mandatory. 
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Accordingly, the mail-in vote upon the Claimed Assessment, and therefore the Claimed 
Assessment itself, was void, invalid, and ineffectual. 
The Association argues that this Court's Levanger and Reedeker precedents 
(discussed more fully in Deppes' initial brief to this Court, holding homeowners 
associations that incorporate are subject to the Nonprofit Corporations Act, including its 
requirement of strict compliance with the unanimous mail-in voting requirements of 
section 16-6-33) do not apply to this case. The Association argues that in those cases the 
Court applied the Nonprofit Corporations Act to the homeowners associations only 
because the associations' bylaws in those cases were silent on the matters at issue in 
those cases. Since the Association's Declarations in this case are not silent on the matter 
of mail-in voting, the Association claims the Declarations control. The Association's 
argument fails. It does nothing to dispel the holdings of those cases that nonprofit 
corporations must comply with the Nonprofit Corporations Act. And nothing in the 
Levanger or Reedeker cases supports the Association's apparent argument that if only the 
association's bylaws had allowed for non-unanimous mail-in voting that such a provision 
would be upheld and allowed in circumvention of the mandatory unanimity provision of 
section 16-6-33 of the Nonprofit Corporations Act. Nor could any such ruling be upheld 
since, as shown above, as a matter of law, bylaws and other corporate documents are 
subordinate to statutes, and bylaws and other corporate documents that are inconsistent 
with statutes as a matter of law are void. E.g., Utah Code § 16-6-22(12). 
In footnote 1 of its Brief the Association argues that the Condominium Act gives 
the Association the unfettered ability to determine its bylaws, citing Section 57-8-16 of 
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This Court should therefore reverse the district court's Order which improperly 
allowed the Association's internal Declarations to circumvent the express unanimity 
requirement for mail-in voting in section 16-6-33 of the Nonprofit Corporations Act. 
II. THE ASSOCIATION'S CITATIONS TO AND ARGUMENTS UNDER 
OTHER PROVISIONS OF THE NONPROFIT CORPORATIONS ACT 
AND THE CONDOMINIUM ACT ARE WITHOUT MERIT 
Attempting to draw the Court's attention away from the unanimity requirement of 
Nonprofit Corporations Act section 16-6-33, the Association cites section 57-8-34(1) of 
the Condominium Act and provisions in the Declarations to the effect that all 
condominium unit owners are subject to the Condominium Act and that provisions of 
Condominium Act and the Association's Declarations are a part of a contract between the 
Association and all owners within the Association with which all owners must comply. 
(Association's Brief, pp. 7-8). Those citations and arguments of the Association are 
completely circular, however, and they ignore controlling law. 
that act. Nothing in that section, however, nor anywhere else in Utah law, provides such 
unfettered discretion to the Association as would allow corporate bylaws to circumvent 
applicable provisions of the Nonprofit Corporations Act, and certainly not to circumvent 
the express and mandatory unanimity requirement of Section 16-6-33. To allow 
nonprofit corporations to simply contract or otherwise draft documents to get around and 
otherwise evade mandatory provisions of the Nonprofit Corporations Act, as the 
Association argues, would neuter the statute and render it completely meaningless. The 
Association's footnote 1 also cites section 57-8-35(1) stating the provisions of the 
Condominium Act apply to condominium associations and govern over the provisions of 
the Nonprofit Corporations Act in cases where there is a conflict between the two acts. 
Beyond admitting that the Nonprofit Corporations Act is indeed applicable to the 
Association, however, that statement is inapposite to this case because there is no conflict 
between any provision of these two acts that are relevant to this case, nor has the 
Association even purported to identify any such conflict. The Condominium Act is silent 
on the issue of mail-in voting requirements, and therefore presents no conflict whatsoever 
with the unanimity requirement of Section 16-6-33 of the Nonprofit Corporations Act 
which governs this case. 
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The provisions relied upon by the Association acknowledge and confirm on their 
face, as they must, that it is only provisions of the Declarations and "agreements and 
determinations lawfully made and/or entered into" that are part of the "contract" between 
the Association and the owners within it. (E.g., Association's Declarations, 
Article XXV). The Declarations, however, and the Claimed Assessment based upon the 
mail-in vote conducted pursuant to the Declarations, are not "lawfully made," because 
they are inconsistent with the unanimity requirement of the governing statute, section 16-
6-33 of the Nonprofit Corporations Act. 
Moreover, the Association's own cited case of Turner v. Hi-Country Homeowners 
Ass 'n further confirms that another part of the "contract" between the Association and its 
members is "the statute under which it [the Association] is incorporated." 910 P.2d 1223, 
1225 (Utah 1996). The Association's own arguments, therefore, circle back to the 
Nonprofit Corporations Act. Since section 16-6-33 of that statute requires unanimity for 
mail-in voting, and since unanimity admittedly was not achieved on the vote for the 
Claimed Assessment in this case, the Claimed Assessment, and the provisions of the 
Declarations purporting to allow passage of the Claimed Assessment without a 
unanimous mail-in vote, is void, invalid, and unenforceable against the Deppes, even 
under the Association's own claimed authorities. 
The Association's claim that section 16-6-30 of the Nonprofit Corporations Act 
somehow tempers the unanimity requirement of section 16-6-33 (Association's Brief, 
p. 12) is completely without merit. In its entirety, section 16-6-30 (which was repealed 
effective April 30, 2001), provided as follows: 
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The right of the members, or any class or classes of members, to vote 
may be limited, enlarged or denied to the extent specified in the 
articles of incorporation or the bylaws. Unless so limited, enlarged or 
denied, each member, regardless of class, shall be entitled to one vote 
on each matter submitted to a vote of members. A member may vote 
in person or, unless the articles of incorporation or the bylaws 
otherwise provide, may vote by proxy executed in writing by the 
member or by his duly authorized attorney in fact. Where trustees or 
officers are to be elected by members, the governing board by 
resolution or the bylaws may provide that such elections may be 
conducted by mail. [Emphasis added]. 
On its face that section clearly and expressly dealt exclusively with a nonprofit 
corporation's authority to limit the right, entitlement {i.e., ability), of members to vote, 
and the method by which votes may be case (i.e., in person, by proxy, or by mail). That 
is different from and has nothing whatsoever to do with, nor does it allow the Association 
to circumvent statutory requirements regarding, the number of those with the right to vote 
who must approve an action in any given vote. It is the latter that is at issue in this case 
and that is the subject of section 16-6-33 (requiring approval by "all of the members 
entitled to vote") which governs this case. Section 16-6-30 is completely off-point. 
The Association's citation to section 16-6a-707 of the Nonprofit Corporations Act 
for the proposition that "a nonprofit organization can proscribe voting procedures in the 
articles of incorporation to be used when a meeting is not held," including to allow mail-
in voting by a simple majority (Association's Brief, p. 12), is misleading to the Court, 
and ultimately contrary to the Association's position in any event. That is because when 
section 16-6a-707 was first enacted, it was assigned an initial effective date of April 30, 
2001. It therefore was not in effect at the time of the vote at issue in this case in the year 
2000. For the Association to cite to section 16-6a-707 without clarifying that it expressly 
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did not apply at the time of the vote at issue in this case is misleading. And the fact that 
that section allowing mail-in voting without unanimity expressly became effective only 
after the vote at issue in this case was taken unequivocally confirms that before the 
effective date of section 16-6a-707 (i.e., at the time the vote was taken in this case) the 
unanimity requirement of section 16-6-33 was still the governing statutory requirement. 
III. THE ASSOCIATION'S ARGUMENTS REGARDING EQUITABLE 
CONVERSION ARE UNAVAILING AND INDEED CONFIRM THE 
DEPPES ARE NOT LIABLE FOR THE CLAIMED ASSESSMENT 
Even if the Claimed Assessment was valid, which it was not for all of the reasons 
shown above, the Association acknowledges that under section 57-8-20(2) of the 
Condominium Act and various provisions of the Association's Declarations it is only an 
"owner" of a condominium unit "at the time the assessment is made" that may be held 
liable to pay it. (Association's Brief, pp. 13-14). As one means of showing that as a 
matter of law the Deppes were not the "owners" of the subject condominium unit (the 
"Subject Condo") at the time the Claimed Assessment at issue in this case was made, 
and therefore are not liable to pay the Claimed Assessment, the Deppes' initial brief to 
this Court included a discussion of the doctrine of equitable conversion that applies in 
Utah and provides that once parties enter into an enforceable contract for the sale of 
property, title to the property equitably passes to the buyer who is then treated as the 
owner even though the deed conveying legal title may not be delivered until later. 
Cannefax v. Clement, 818 P.2d 546, 550-51 (Utah 1991). Since the district court held 
(correctly and without appeal by the Association) that the Deppes had entered into a valid 
and binding contract for the sale of the Subject Condo on December 13, 2000, and since 
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the Association itself indisputably has stated the effective date of the Claimed 
Assessment as December 14, 2000, as a matter of law pursuant to the doctrine of 
equitable conversion the Deppes were not the "owners" of the Subject Condo when the 
Claimed Assessment was made. Rather, as a matter of law the Deppes' buyer, Bryan T. 
Morgan, became the owner of the Subject Condo on December 13, 2000, when, as the 
district court found, a binding contract was reached. It was Bryan T. Morgan, therefore, 
who was the owner of the Subject Condo when the Claimed Assessment purportedly was 
made on December 14, 2000, not the Deppes. As a matter of law, therefore, pursuant to 
section 57-8-20(2) of the Condominium Act, even if the Claimed Assessment was validly 
made, it is a debt only of Bryan T. Morgan, the then owner of the Subject Condo, not of 
the Deppes. 
The Association makes the same error that the district court did in its ruling, 
focusing on the terms of the sale contract including the fact that the closing was not 
scheduled for and did not in fact occur until the deed from the Deppes conveying the 
Subject Condo was signed (January 2, 2001) and recorded (January 5, 2001). Neither the 
district court nor the Association cited any authority whatsoever showing any of those 
facts to be relevant in any way. That is because they are not relevant to an equitable 
conversion analysis. In fact, the very doctrine itself presumes that no deed has yet been 
signed or recorded, and it nevertheless treats title as having passed just by virtue of the 
existence of the contract for sale. Appraisal, disclosure, inspection, risk of loss, closing 
dates, and all other provisions and terms of the contract are irrelevant to the application 
and effect of the doctrine of equitable conversion. So too is the fact that the contract was 
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not recorded (which is particularly off-point to this case, since the Association 
indisputably had actual knowledge of the Deppes' pending sale and indeed intentionally 
interfered with it in attempts to force the Deppes to sign the Assumption Agreement upon 
which the Association now relies). 
The Association's claim that the Utah Supreme Court applies the doctrine of 
equitable conversion only in situations where it is asserted by the vendee (Association's 
Brief, pp. 16-17) is untrue. The only cases cited by the Association in support of that 
claimed proposition are Cannefax v. Clement, 818 P.2d 546 (Utah 1991) and Reynolds v. 
Van Wagoner, 592 P.2d 593 (Utah 1979). Cannefax, however, had nothing to do with 
holding a vendor could not assert the doctrine of equitable conversion. Rather, it merely 
cited to the Reynolds case in a statement of mere dictum. Even Reynolds did not hold 
that vendors cannot apply the doctrine of equitable conversion. Instead, it stood for the 
proposition that the doctrine is to be applied to achieve equitable results, and that it 
therefore was not applicable to the situation there at issue; the fact that the party seeking 
to invoke the doctrine was the vendor was merely incidental to the court's ruling. 
Reynolds, 592 P.2d at 594. The Association's arguments regarding the doctrine of 
equitable conversion therefore find no support in either of the cases cited by the 
Association. 
Indeed, the confirmation in Reynolds that equitable conversion is to be applied to 
achieve equitable results actually supports application of the doctrine to this case. See 
also, e.g., Cary-Lombardv. Sheets, 10 Utah 322, 37 P. 572, 572 (1894) (applying 
equitable conversion against buyer, stating contract to purchase gave him "an equitable 
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interest in the premises" to which a mechanics' lien attached in favor of a contractor he 
hired to improve the property). It would be inequitable to require the Deppes to pay the 
Claimed Assessment that was not made (even if it was validly made, which the Deppes 
deny) until after they sold the Subject Condo, that admittedly did not become due until 
after they signed the deed conveying title to the Subject Condo, and that was for repairs 
that admittedly did not even begin for several months after they signed the deed 
conveying title to the Subject Condo so they never received any benefit from the later-
made repairs. This is an appropriate case for the Court to do equity by applying the 
doctrine of equitable conversion to confirm that by virtue of their sale contract signed 
before the Claimed Assessment was made, title to the property equitably passed to their 
buyer and the Deppes therefore were not ''owners" liable for the Claimed Assessment. 
The Association cited section 57-8-25 of the Condominium Act, for the 
proposition that both Deppes and their buyer were liable for the Claimed Assessment. 
That section, however, further confirms that Deppes have no liability for the Claimed 
Assessment. Section 57-8-25 provides that "in a voluntary conveyance, the grantee of a 
unit shall be jointly and severally liable with the grantor for all unpaid assessments 
against the latter for his share of the common expenses up to the time of the grant or 
conveyance." In this case, the Association itself admits that even the first installment 
payment on the Claimed Assessment was not due until February 28, 2001. The 
Association further admits, and it is otherwise indisputable, that the Deppes signed the 
deed conveying legal title to the Subject Condo on January 2, 2001, and that such deed 
was recorded in the office of the Summit County Recorder on January 5, 2001. Since the 
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first installment payment on the Claimed Assessment was not even due until long after 
the Deppes conveyed the Subject Condo to Bryan Morgan, there simply were no "unpaid 
assessments ... up to the time of the grant or conveyance," and therefore nothing for 
which the Deppes were liable to pay by the time they indisputably under any measure 
were no longer the "owners" of the Subject Condo. 
This Court should reverse the district court, hold the doctrine of equitable 
conversion applies to this case and confirms the Deppes were not "owners" of the Subject 
Condo subject to any liability for the Claimed Assessment when it was made. 
IV. THE ASSOCIATION'S ARGUMENTS REGARDING THE ASSUMPTION 
AGREEMENT MISREPRESENT THE DOCUMENT ITSELF AND THE 
DEPPES' ARGUMENTS REGARDING THE DOCUMENT 
The Association argues that by signing the Assumption Agreement the Deppes 
ratified or affirmed owing a debt to the Association for the Claimed Assessment. The 
Association further argues that the district court found that the Assumption agreement 
was not signed under duress, and that there was valid consideration for the agreement. 
The Association also states that the Deppes did not appeal those findings. 
A. Deppes Have Appealed Regarding Duress and Lack of Consideration 
Addressing the Association's above-stated arguments in reverse order, its claim 
that the Deppes did not appeal the district court's findings regarding duress and 
consideration is patently false and untrue. In their "Petition for Permission to Appeal 
From Interlocutory Order" that was filed with this Court, the Deppes directly and 
expressly listed as one of the issues being presented for review by this Court the 
following: 
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Issue No, 3: Whether the district court erred in granting summary 
judgment declaring the purported Assumption Agreement was valid 
(i.e., that it was supported by consideration and that there was not any 
duress). [Petition for Permission to Appeal From Interlocutory Order, 
p. 10; see also id. at 16-20 (arguing invalidity of the Assumption 
Agreement for duress and lack of consideration)]. 
By order of this Court, Deppes' interlocutory appeal petition was granted 
in toto, without reservation or qualification of any kind. The invalidity of the 
purported Assumption Agreement for duress and lack of consideration therefore 
is indeed a subject of this appeal. 
B. The Assumption Agreement Is Void for Lack of Consideration. 
The district court erred in ruling the Assumption Agreement was supported by 
consideration. The only purported consideration to the Deppes noted by the district court 
was that they "were able to close on the sale of their unit." (R. 0445). That was always 
the Deppes' right, however. Since the Deppes were not given anything new in exchange 
for the Assumption Agreement, the Assumption Agreement lacks consideration and is 
therefore unenforceable. E.g., Copper State Leasing Co. v. Blackner Appliance & 
Furniture Co., 770 P.2d 88, 91 (Utah 1988). In fact, as discussed more fully below, the 
Association's interference with the Deppes' right to close on the sale, instructing the title 
company at the eleventh hour not to close the transaction the Deppes had worked two 
years to obtain, pending the Deppes' diverting from their travel (including Mrs. Deppe 
who was suffering severe health problems) to the scheduled closing to sign the 
Assumption Agreement regarding the statutorily invalid Claimed Assessment or lose 
their pending sale, constituted a tortious interference with the Deppes' rights and 
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contract, and an illegitimate abuse of power by the Association amounting as a matter of 
law to duress which renders the Assumption Agreement void and invalid in any event. 
The Association had no right or authority to interfere with the closing of Deppes' sale. It 
was instead merely attempting through such wrongful means to do what it could not do 
rightfully, improperly forcing Deppes to sign the document or risk losing their sale so the 
Association could have additional parties (Deppes) from whom to attempt to collect the 
invalid Claimed Assessment. 
C. The Assumption Agreement Is Void for Duress, 
The district court erred in ruling the Assumption Agreement was not procured by 
the Association through duress. The district court stated: 
There was nothing that amounted to duress on the Deppes to sign the 
assumption agreement. They could have refused to sign and the sale may 
not have gone through that day, but this alone does not amount to duress. 
The Deppes wanted to sell the unit and in turn decided to sign the 
assumption agreement and pay $250. This does not amount to duress. 
[R. 0445]. 
The district court's ruling improperly analyzed the law of duress, including 
particularly failing to recognize that the court must look in each case at the particular 
exigencies in which the party finds itself. 
The Utah Supreme Court has adopted the legal standards of duress set forth in 
sections 175 and 176 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts. See Andreini v. 
Hultgren, 860 P.2d 916 (Utah 1993). Section 175 of the Restatement states that a 
contract is voidable by the victim: "If a party's manifestation of assent is induced by an 
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improper threat by the other party that leaves the victim no reasonable alternative^]" 
Section 176 sets forth the conditions under which a threat is improper. It states: 
(1) A threat is improper if 
(a) what is threatened is a crime or a tort, or the threat itself would be 
a crime or a tort if it resulted in obtaining property. 
(d) the threat is a breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing 
under a contract with the recipient. 
(2) A threat is improper if the resulting exchange is not on fair terms, and 
(a) the threatened act would harm the recipient and would not 
significantly benefit the party making the threat; 
(b) the effectiveness of the Ihreat in inducing the manifestation of 
assent is significantly increased by prior unfair dealing by the party making 
the threat, or 
(c) what is threatened is otherwise a use of power for illegitimate 
ends. [Restatement (Second) of Contracts, § 176]. 
Comment a to Restatement Section 176 explains: 
The categories within Subsection (1) involve threats that are either so 
shocking that the court will not inquire into the fairness of the resulting 
exchange (see Clauses (a) and (b)) or that in themselves necessarily involve 
some element of unfairness (see Clauses (c) and (d)). Those within 
Subsection (2) involve threats in which the impropriety consists of the 
threat in combination with resulting unfairness. Such a threat is not 
improper if it can be shown that the exchange is one on fair terms. [Id., 
cmt. a.]. 
Here, the conditions of duress are satisfied because the Association acted 
tortiously in that it threatened the title company which was handling the closing of the 
Deppes' sale to Mr. Morgan that the title company should not close on the Deppes' 
transaction with Mr. Morgan because the Association had a Claimed Assessment lien 
against the Subject Condo. (R. 0390). That threat proved effective, since the title 
company in fact refused to close on the Deppes' sale transaction until the Association 
approved it after the Deppes signed the Assumption Agreement demanded by the 
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Association. That presents the very paradigm of tortious interference with the Deppes' 
economic relations by the Association, and therefore was an improper threat leaving the 
Deppes no reasonable alternative but to accede to the Association's demand to sign the 
Assumption Agreement, invalidating that document for duress. 
In Leigh Furniture and Carpet Co. v. horn, 657 P.2d 293 (Utah 1982), the Utah 
Supreme Court set forth the elements of tortious interference with economic relations. 
To make out a claim "the plaintiff must prove (1) that the defendant intentionally 
interfered with the plaintiffs existing or potential economic relations, (2) for an improper 
purpose or by improper means, (3) causing injury to the plaintiff." Id. at 304. Here, the 
Association represented to the title company that the Claimed Assessment had been 
issued, and that it created a lien on the Subject Condo. As a matter of law, however, the 
mail-in vote upon, and therefore the Claimed Assessment itself, was statutorily void, 
invalid, and ineffectual. Also, even if the Claimed Assessment was valid, it did not 
become due and therefore as a matter of law did not create or constitute any lien upon the 
Subject Condo, until long after the Deppes had sold and even conveyed the Subject 
Condo to Mr. Morgan, and indeed never did because the notice of lien was signed by the 
Association's attorney rather than a manager of the Association. In making those 
As shown in the Deppes' initial brief to this Court, Section 57-8-20(2) of the 
Condominium Act states that an unpaid assessment becomes a lien against a 
condominium unit only if it is not paid "when due" and if a notice of lien is recorded "by 
the manager or management committee." The Association does not dispute the argument 
set forth in the Deppes' initial brief that no lien could have arisen because the first 
installment payment on the Claimed Assessment was not due until long after the Deppes 
had sold the Subject Condo. The Association argues only that the attorney who signed 
the notice of lien was retained by the Association's management committee, and 
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representations about the Claimed Assessment and a purported lien, therefore, the 
Association clouded the title to the Subject Condo, thereby forcing the Deppes to sign the 
Assumption Agreement in order to consummate their sale to Mr. Morgan. This conduct 
by the Association is sufficient to make out a prima facie case of intentional interference 
with existing or potential economic relations, and therefore also constituted duress by the 
Association invalidating the Assumption Agreement thereby obtained. 
Furthermore, even if the Association's conduct was not a tort, the resulting 
exchange was unfair and the Association's use of its power was illegitimate. That is, 
through the unfair exercise of its power, the Association was able to obtain the 
Assumption Agreement, something to which it was not otherwise entitled. Specifically, 
the evidence showed that the Deppes were ready to close on the sale of the Subject 
Condo to Mr. Morgan after the execution on December 13, 2000, of Addendum 3 to their 
contract with Mr. Morgan, and in fact went all the way to Park City to close when they 
were informed that the title company would not close the transaction because the 
Association's attorney had sent a letter to the title company that said "do not close on this 
unit." (R. 0390). This was illegitimate because there was no valid assessment to begin 
with, as shown above, no obligation of the Deppes to pay any assessment even if it was 
valid, also as shown above, and nothing slopping the Association from collecting the 
therefore "acted as a representative of the committee." (Association's Brief, p. 21). 
That, however, is merely an admission that the Claimed Assessment was not signed "by 
the manager or management committee," as expressly required by Section 57-8-20(2) of 
the Condominium Act. Since both elements of Section 57-8-20(2) must be present for 
any lien to arise, the Association's failure to satisfy each (and either) of those elements 
means that as a matter of law no lien ever arose regarding the Claimed Assessment. 
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Claimed Assessment from Mr. Morgan, including by foreclosure of the Subject Condo as 
against him if the Claimed Assessment became overdue and properly ripened into a lien 
upon the Subject Condo. 
Having satisfied the "improper threat" requirement, the second question is whether 
the Deppes had a reasonable alternative to signing the Assumption Agreement. The 
answer is that they did not. The district court failed to take into account that in Andreini, 
the Utah Supreme Court recognized, in addressing the "no reasonable alternative" prong, 
that "duress can often result from situations in which time is of the essence" and that "the 
reasonable alternative standard is a practical one under which account must be taken of 
the exigencies in which the victim finds himself." Andreini, 860 P.2d at 923 (citing 
Restatement (Second) § 175 cmt. b). There the Court held that Andreini had adduced 
sufficient evidence to raise an issue of material fact precluding summary judgment. In 
this case, as in Andreini, the Deppes had introduced evidence regarding the various 
exigencies in which the Deppes found themselves including: (1) they had been trying to 
sell the Property for over two years; and (2) Mrs. Deppe's health was poor, adding 
additional pressure to sell the Property; (3) they thought they had a final contract and 
were all set to close when the Association held up the closing of the transaction. 
(R. 0390). In light of these facts, the Assumption Agreement clearly was improperly 
obtained by duress and is therefore invalid and unenforceable. At a very minimum, there 
is a question of fact as to the invalidity of the Assumption Agreement due to duress, 
thereby precluding summary judgment. E.g., Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c) (allowing summary 
judgment only where "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact"). Either way, the 
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district court erred in entering summary judgment for the Association summarily 
concluding despite those facts that there was no duress. 
D. The Deppes Did Not Ratify or Affirm, and Indeed Denied, Any 
Obligation to Pay the Claimed Assessment 
The district court ruling stated by way of footnote that "although the Deppes 
obligation is not derived from the assumption agreement, it does reflect the Deppes 
acknowledgment that they were obligated to pay the claimed assessment." (R. 0446). 
The Association appears to key upon that ruling, arguing in its brief to this Court that by 
signing the Assumption Agreement the Deppes somehow acknowledged or affirmed they 
were liable to pay the Claimed Assessment. (Association's Brief, pp. 18-20). To the 
extent that language of the district court's Order may arguably be a finding of fact by the 
district court that the Deppes purportedly acknowledged any obligation to pay the 
Claimed Assessment, that is in direct conflict with Mr. Deppe's sworn deposition 
testimony quoted for the district court that "I didn't feel that I owed [the Claimed 
Assessment], period," and in which he confirmed that "[e]ven as of the time [he] signed 
the assumption agreement, [he] didn't feel like [he was] obligated on that special 
assessment." (R. 0390 - R. 0391). That is therefore yet an additional reason why the 
district court's Order declaring the Assumption Agreement is valid should be reversed, 
because it is contrary to Mr. Deppe's sworn testimony that he signed the agreement only 
under duress and specifically not believing that it obligated him in any way to pay the 
Claimed Assessment. The district court's ruling otherwise constituted a weighing of 
evidence by the district court which is improper on summary judgment. Utah R. Civ. 
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P. 56(c) (stating summary judgment can be granted only if "there is no genuine issue as 
to any material fact"). See also e.g., Nyman v. McDonald, 966 P.2d 1210, 1213 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1998) ("[o]ne sworn statement under oath [involving a material fact] is all that is 
necessary to create a factual issue, thereby precluding summary judgment.") (quoting 
Arnica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Schettler, 768 P.2d 950, 957 (Utah Ct. App. 1989)) (alteration in 
original); Diysdale v. Ford Motor Co., 947 P.2d 678, 680 (Utah 1997) (holding in 
proceedings on a motion for summary judgment all facts and inferences must be viewed 
in the light most favorable to the non-moving party); Durham v. Margetts, 571 P.2d 
1332, 1334-35 (Utah 1977) (all facts asserted in opposition to summary judgment must 
be taken as established for the purposes of the summary judgment proceedings); Lucky 
Seven Rodeo Corp. v. Clark, 755 P.2d 750, 752 (Utah Ct.App. 1988) ("It is inappropriate 
for courts to weigh disputed material facts in ruling on a summary judgment") 
In concluding that the Assumption Agreement purportedly reflects an 
acknowledgement by the Deppes of an obligation to pay the Claimed Assessment, the 
district court in its Order, and the Association in its Brief, cite to language in the 
Assumption Agreement recitals section that sellers are personally obligated to pay the 
Claimed Assessment, and another provision stating the Deppes are not released by the 
Association from any liability for the Claimed Assessment. None of those provisions, 
however, nor indeed any language in the Assumption Agreement, is an enforceable 
acknowledgement of any debt or obligation by the Deppes. The noted language that 
sellers are personally obligated to pay the Claimed Assessment is of no effect. It appears 
in the recitals section of the Assumption Agreement. Utah has long recognized that 
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recitals paragraphs are not binding terms or provisions of a contract and that "[t]he actual 
intention of the parties must prevail over dry words, inapt expressions, and careless 
recitation in the contract". E.g., Udy v. Jensen, 222 P. 597 (Utah 1924). As noted above, 
Mr. Deppe's sworn testimony was that he did not believe he was obligated by the 
Assumption Agreement or otherwise to pay the Claimed Assessment and did not intend 
by signing that document to obligate himself to pay it. The other provisions cited by the 
district court, and the Association, are merely statements that the Association was not 
thereby releasing the Deppes from any liability or obligation regarding the Claimed 
Assessment. Those provisions, of course, beg the question of what the Deppes' liabilities 
and obligations were. As shown and for all of the reasons set forth above, the Deppes 
simply had no liability or obligation to pay the Claimed Assessment.4 
Importantly, the Assumption Agreement certainly does not contain any promise of 
payment by the Deppes, as the district court correctly found and which the Association 
did not appeal. (R. 0445 ("the assumption agreement does not create the Deppes \sic] 
obligation to pay the claimed assessment") (emphasis added)). Accordingly, at best for 
The Association's further citation to Section 3 of the Assumption Agreement 
stating "Buyer and Seller acknowledge that none of the obligations under the special 
assessment are subject to any right of offset, defense or counterclaim of any kind" 
(Association's Brief, p. 20), is likewise unavailing. That language too begs the question 
of what "obligations" the parties had under the Claimed Assessment, which as a matter of 
law were none due to the void and invalid vote. Nothing in the language of that provision 
of the Assumption Agreement, nor anywhere else in the Assumption Agreement makes 
valid, nor could it, the vote that was void and invalid ab initio as a matter of the 
unanimity requirement of Utah's Nonprofit Corporations Act Section 16-6-33 which this 
Court has confirmed was enacted as a mandatory protection of the rights of condominium 
owners in a position such as the Deppes. See Levanger v. Vincent, 2000 UT App. 103, 
Tf 19, 3 P.3d 187 (holding Section 16-6-33 exists to "protect the members' interests" is 
"mandatory" and requires "strict compliance"). 
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the Association, the Assumption Agreement is ambiguous. Where a contract is 
ambiguous, it must be strictly construed against the drafter; here, the Association. E.g., 
Jones Waldo Holbrook & McDonough v. Dawson, 923 P.2d 1366, 1372 (Utah 1997) 
(applying general rule of contract interpretation that ambiguous language is to be 
construed against the drafter). 
The district court erred in stating, contrary to the sworn testimony, that the 
Assumption Agreement was an acknowledgement of indebtedness by the Deppes. This 
Court should therefore reverse the district court's summary judgment order. 
CONCLUSION 
The district court's ruling in this case is in error on each of the issues addressed 
above, and none of the Association's arguments could support sustaining that erroneous 
ruling. Deppes therefore respectfully request this Court to reverse the district court, and 
declare Deppes are not liable in any way to pay any part of the Claimed Assessment. 
Deppes respectfully request the Court to hear oral argument in this case, and to reverse 
the district court. 
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